Factual background

This case was an appeal by the father against the permission given by the Judge of first instance for the mother to remove the parties’ two sons (C aged 9, and F aged 5) from the jurisdiction in order to go and live in the United Arab Emirates.

Both mother and father are nationals of other countries and do not have any immediate family in England nor do they own property in England. Both boys are British nationals.

The parents met in 2012 and the children were born in 2015 and 2020. The parents separated in 2021.

In October 2021, the mother applied for a Child Arrangements Order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 and raised allegations of domestic abuse. Consequently, a fact finding hearing was ordered.

The findings made against the father included numerous physical assaults on the mother which caused a range of physical injuries. The injuries included a permanent ‘deforming disability’ to the mother’s middle finger which affected her role as a surgeon. Further incidents included attempting to suffocate the mother with a pillow on at least two occasions and spitting on her face so many times that ‘her face and hair were covered with saliva’.

The father was also found to have been coercive and controlling and that his behaviour would have had a ‘significant harmful impact on any children who witnessed it or who were present in the property when it took place’. Furthermore, the father was found to have physically chastised and caused emotional harm to C.

However it was noted that much of the father’s parenting was positive.

In late 2022, the father was charged with a number of criminal offences which related to the domestic abuse towards the mother. The trial is scheduled for September 2026.

Subsequently after being charged, the father declined to engage with Cafcass Family Court Advisors on the basis of privilege against self-incrimination.

In February 2023, a live with order was made in favour of the mother and a spend time with order was made in favour of the father for supervised contact in the home and unsupervised contact in the community.

Following this final hearing, the mother began discussions with the father’s solicitors in relation to financial relief for the children under Schedule 1 of the Children’s Act 1989 for lump sum and periodical payments. The solicitors said the father was limited to payments of £1000 per month until the conclusion of his criminal proceedings.

Upon receiving this information, on 12 May 2023 the mother issued proceedings to apply for permission to relocate the children for 5 years to live in Dubai, where she had been offered a job, on the basis of being unable to meet the monthly costs for the family in England due to her financial situation; whereas, the job in Dubai would allow enough annual income to pay for the children.

Further, in October 2023, the mother sought enforcement of the Child Arrangements Order from February 2023 stating that the father had been in breach.

Judgment of first instance

‘In relation to domestic abuse, the Judge appropriately referred himself to PD12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 : ‘Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm’ (‘PD12J FPR 2010’), and to Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (Court of Appeal) (‘ Re H-N ‘).’

The Judge found that the father had hit F during contact on more than one occasion.

The Judge further found that the paternal family had been using litigation proceedings in Country X against the mother in relation to alleged defamatory statements as a form of coercive control, and that these proceedings had been supported by the father.

Additionally, the judge found that the father continued to perpetrate or to be complicit in the perpetration of domestic abuse.

The Judge described how the relocation plan had initially been motivated by financial concerns however the focus had shifted to the need to move on from the effects and trauma caused by the domestic abuse.

In reaching his decision, the welfare checklist factors from Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 were considered.

It was noted that both parties accepted that the father’s contact with the children would need to be supervised until at least the criminal trial, however the father seemed to have no appreciation of why the mother was finding it very difficult to co-parent with him and seemed to not accept there was a need for contact to be supervised.

The Judge accepted there was a risk of harm to the children due to the potential for a severance of their relationship with their father if they relocated and was clear that this risk should not be underestimated.

In relation to the expert evidence, that stated that an English court order cannot be relied upon to be enforced in the Courts in Dubai or Abu Dhabi, the Judge considered this to not be ‘fatal’ to the mother’s application and was simply a relevant factor for consideration. Furthermore, the Judge expressed his confidence that the mother would promote contact with the father, irrespective of whether litigation was an option.

Ultimately on this basis, the Judge of first instance granted permission for the mother to remove the children from the jurisdiction and scheduled a further hearing to consider the final Child Arrangements Order which would be put in place upon the children’s removal to the UAE.

the Law

Under a section 8 or section 13(1)(b) Children Act 1989 application, the test is set out in section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 that the child’s welfare is paramount and the determination is where the child’s interests truly lie.

In relation to Section 1(2A), the Court noted:

While section 1(2A) CA 1989 (which requires the court to consider with care the involvement of both parents in the life of the child as a component of ‘furthering’ the child’s overall welfare), does not formally apply to an application under section 13 CA 1989 , there is no doubt that its provision generally heightens the court’s scrutiny of the proposed arrangements on an application for permanent international relocation. Notably, and of relevance to the instant appeal, section 1(2A) CA 1989 expressly requires the court to consider whether a “contrary” picture is “shown”, which would indicate that involvement of each parent in the child’s life (in the manner proposed or at all) will not in fact “further the child’s welfare”

The Court considered that an area relevant to the judgment that had less clarity was how the court should evaluate proportionality. ‘Re F [2015] laid out that an ordinary balancing exercise:

“… will inevitably focus on the welfare analysis of each of the realistic options and may amount to no more than an acknowledgement that one option is better than the other and that the preferred option represents a proportionate interference in the Art 8 European Convention rights of those involved.” 

The approach taken in Re C (Internal Relocation) was that given that the ‘left-behind’ parent would always be able to raise an argument under Article 8 of the ECHR, consideration must be given to the proportionality of such an interference.

Given that this was a case featuring domestic abuse, PD12J must be deployed. The Court considered paragraph 37 of PD12J to be of particular relevance to this case:

• “In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider.
• (a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living.
• (b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents;
• (c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent;
• (d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and
• (e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse”.

Where domestic abuse is proved, the court in an international relocation case will consider its orders in the same way as it would a domestic private law case and:

• protect “the safety and wellbeing of the child and the parent with whom the child is living, and … not expose either of them to the risk of further harm” (PD12J, para.5)

However, additional considerations arise in relation to the geographic distance between the perpetrator parent and the relevant child, any available measures to protect victims of domestic abuse, and that post-relocation there is a likely change of legal jurisdiction.

Therefore, when considering the appropriate order to make ‘the court may well find it appropriate to consider (specifically in relation to harm or risk of harm in section 1(3)(e) CA 1989:

1. Whether the abuse is in any respect ongoing, and how the victim(s) can be protected in each jurisdiction;
2. The extent to which, if at all, the abuse has informed or influenced the applicant’s decision to issue an application to relocate;
3. What support (family or professional) will be available to the victims of abuse (abused parent and/or child) in this country and in the country to which relocation is sought?
4. How the abused parent and/or child can be protected from further abuse from the perpetrator while living in this country and in the country to which relocation is sought. What, if any, orders would be available from the court in the country to which relocation is sought? What other protective measures are likely to be available in the country to which relocation is sought?
5. How ongoing risk to the abused parent and/or child from the perpetrator of the abuse can be assessed, and/or managed, if the abused parent and/or child is living in this country or abroad (“the court should ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm”: PD12J, para.35); this is likely to be relevant to child arrangements (‘time spent with’) orders;
6. What professional (or other) supervision of contact is available both in this country and in the country to which relocation is sought? How can indirect contact be managed and/or (if relevant) supervised?

The Appeal

The Court of Appeal made the following findings:

(a) the judge had incorrectly made the transfer of title from the husband to the wife the determinative factor in determining how the 2017 Assets were characterised;

(b) the source of the 2017 Assets, rather than the title to them, was the determinative factor;

(c) there was nothing which justified the conclusion that the importance and relevance of the source of “most of” the 2017 Assets being non-matrimonial was in any way diminished as a result of the transfer of title to those assets to the wife;

(d) the transfer of the 2017 Assets had not matrimonialised any of the transferred assets;

(e) 75% of the 2017 Assets remained non-matrimonial property and were not subject to the sharing principle (and, although not explicitly spelt out, it was implicit in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that 25% of the 2017 Assets was matrimonial property by reason of the contributions of both parties and should be shared equally);

(f) the correct figure for all the matrimonial property subject to the sharing principle was £50.48 million;

(g) the fair outcome on an application of the sharing principle would provide the wife with approximately £25 million (half of £50.48 million) in place of the judge’s award of £45 million, leaving the husband with approximately £107 million (of which the figure included his share of the matrimonial property and his non-matrimonial property);

(h) the judge had not carried out a needs assessment and, as the Court of Appeal was unable fairly to determine the wife’s needs so as to conclude that an award of £25 million met her needs, the matter was remitted for a needs assessment.

The wife appealed the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the basis that the Court was wrong to conclude that matrimonialisation did not occur when the 2017 Assets were transferred to her.

The Law

Section 25 gives the court a wide discretion and requires that the court must have regard ‘to all the circumstances of the case’.

“25 Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise its powers under ss. 23 , 24 …

(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23 , 24 … above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.

(2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23 … [or] 24 … in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters—

1. the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;
2. the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
3. the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;
4. the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
5. any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
6. the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;
7. the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;
8. in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.”

The Court considered that there are two leading cases relevant to this appeal.

White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 establishes that there is a distinction between property owned before the marriage in addition to inherited property in contrast to matrimonial property. This distinction is relevant in high value cases where the matrimonial property is able to encompass the financial needs of the claimant.

In Miller/McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24; [2006] 2 AC 618 Baroness Hale outlines three rationales for the redistribution of resources:

1. ‘The relationship has generated needs which it is right that the other party should meet’
2. ‘A second rationale, which is closely related to need, is compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage “
3. “A third rationale is the sharing of the fruits of the matrimonial partnership “

Likewise, Lord Nicholls’s speech in the same case referred to three principles: financial needs, compensation and sharing.

In relation to the source of the asset, Baroness Hale stated the following:

“The source of the assets may be taken into account but its importance will diminish over time.”

Lord Nicholls added the following:

This does not mean that, when exercising his discretion, a judge in this country must treat all property in the same way. The statute requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances is that there is a real difference, a difference of source, between (1) property acquired during the marriage otherwise than by inheritance or gift, sometimes called the marital acquest but more usually the matrimonial property, and (2) other property. The former is the financial product of the parties’ common endeavour, the latter is not. The parties’ matrimonial home, even if this was brought into the marriage at the outset by one of the parties, usually has a central place in any marriage.

factual background

The parents married in Kabul in 2009 and had two children born in 2011 (A), and 2015 (B), respectively.

In 2014, the father met L, who grew up and continues to live in England. The father first visited England in 2017, and subsequently made a dishonest application to settle in England on the basis he was L’s partner, using a forged certificate of his divorce from the mother.

In February 2019, the father set up a home with L in the UK and in March 2019, they were married. The mother and children did not become aware of the father’s marriage to L until 2020.

In April 2022, the father applied for a visa in order to bring the children to the UK. He fraudulently claimed in his application that he had sole responsibility for both children, that they lived with their Aunt, and referred to the mother using an incorrect surname. The mother was not made aware of this application.

In summer 2022, the father informed the mother that he was taking the children to a medical appointment in Kabul and instead took A and B to Pakistan in hopes of later obtaining a Visa for them to enter the UK. The children remained there for three months until they were returned to the mother on the basis that their visa applications were rejected. The applications were rejected as the mother had contacted the British Embassy to inform them she did not consent to the application.

The judge of first instance found that on 4^th June 2023, the parents argued about the children during which the father assaulted the mother and caused injury to her face.

On 5^th July 2023, the father took the children out of school and brought them to England, having now obtained visas. The mother did not discover that the children were in this country until August 2023.

Since arriving in England, both children have refused any form of contact with the mother and neither has expressed any regret about leaving Afghanistan and their family and home there.

‘A’ has been treated by CAMHS in England for trauma relating to physical and emotional abuse at the hands of her mother in Afghanistan. The Court of Appeal noted that there is no contemporaneous evidence that relates to any abuse by the mother.

An unsuccessful video contact took place in March 2024 where when the mother joined the call ‘the children refused to speak to her and they began to sob uncontrollably’.

factual background

In relation to the mother’s consent about the children’s initial removal, the Judge of first instance found that:

50. I conclude then that the father did wrongfully remove the children from the care of the mother, on two occasions. (I see the journey to Pakistan in 2022 as fuelled by the same dynamic and working in much the same way as the removal here in 2023.) In the sense that he removed them without the mother’s consent. I do note that he did so because of fear for his own security in Afghanistan, fear for the children, as girls, in Afghanistan, and fear of leaving the girls behind. I highlight here, and will explore this more fully below, his fear was not merely a selfish fear that he would lose them, but fear for their care with their mother.

In relation to Transnational Marriage Abandonment, the Judge found:

52. I do not want to become involved in definitions, or a linguistic analysis of ‘transnational abandonment’. The mother, I have already found, was left in Afghanistan while the father without her consent brought the children to this country. It has been his case at times during these proceedings (as it was before me) that the plan would be that the children would come here with him and then he would help the mother to come. There is no evidence that he has taken steps to help the mother come, save for the 2022 visa to Pakistan. He knew full well that his evidence of a divorce would make it more difficult for her to come as her best chance would have been as his wife. Insofar then as he might have said her following was a possibility he would have misled her.

The children had told the Children’s Guardian that whilst living with their mother in Afghanistan they had seen their mother return from her sister in law’s with a knife in hand and covered in blood. On this issue, the first instance Judge made the following finding:

…On a balance of probabilities assessment I do consider that the mother came back, and the children saw her, with a knife and with blood on her. I do not find that she has stabbed anyone, but I do find that the children having witnessed this, and having heard their mother talk about using a knife were frightened by what they saw.

Furthermore, the Judge declined to make a finding of alienating behaviour in respect of either the father or L towards the children about their mother but commented on the ‘polarising effect of the litigation’.

The mother therefore appealed on the following grounds:

1. The judge failed to provide adequate reasons in support of his evaluation of: the allegations of transnational marriage abandonment; the abuse allegations against the mother; and as to whether the father and L have perpetrated alienating behaviours.
2. The judge’s reasons for excusing the father’s actions in abducting the children from the care of their mother in Afghanistan are perverse and irrational and should be set aside.
3. The judge erred in refusing to make a clear finding that the mother is a victim of transnational marriage abandonment and failing to analyse the consequences of the father’s actions in abducting the children and failing to take any steps to assist the mother to join the children in the UK.
4. The judge adopted a flawed approach in finding that the children have suffered physical and emotional abuse perpetrated by the mother.
5. The judge’s decision that the father and L have not perpetrated alienating behaviours in seeking to exclude the mother from the children’s lives is wrong.

Child abduction and kidnapping

The Court of Appeal considered the criminal case of R v Kayani [2011] EWCA Crim 2871; [2012] 1 WLR 1927 which concerned child abduction in order to emphasise that child abduction is not just a criminal offence but also ‘a pernicious form of child abuse’.

• At its most serious, therefore, the offence of child abduction is akin to kidnapping. On conviction for kidnapping a sentence of life imprisonment is available. For offences contrary to the 1984 Act, the maximum sentence is 7 years imprisonment. This wide discrepancy seems illogical.
• “54. The abduction of children from a loving parent is an offence of unspeakable cruelty to the loving parent and to the child or children, whatever they may later think of the parent from whom they have been estranged as a result of the abduction. It is a cruel offence even if the criminal responsible for it is the other parent. Any reference in mitigation to the right to family life, whether at common law, or in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention, is misconceived. In effect the submission involves praying in aid and seeking to rely on the very principle which the defendant has deliberately violated, depriving the other parent of the joy of his or her children and depriving the children from contact with a loving parent with whom they no longer wish to communicate. …”

Furthermore, the Court in the present proceedings emphasised that ‘Child abduction of this kind may also be an extreme form of domestic abuse.’ as it ‘may amount to controlling behaviour’ and is something ‘clearly capable of amounting to psychological, emotional or other abuse’.

Transnational marriage abandonment

The Court was clear that ‘Transnational marriage abandonment is itself a form of domestic abuse and harm to children.’

Paragraph 2B of PD12J states that:

• ‘For the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that “domestic abuse” includes, but is not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and transnational marriage abandonment.’

Furthermore, paragraph 3 defines ‘abandonment’ as:

• “Abandonment” refers to the practice whereby a husband, in England and Wales, deliberately abandons or “strands” his foreign national wife abroad, usually without financial resources, in order to prevent her from asserting matrimonial and/or residence rights in England and Wales. It may involve children who are either abandoned with, or separated from, their mother.

The Court went on to state: in an appropriate case, the court should, as a matter of common justice to the left-behind parent, recognise TMA for what it is: an extreme form of domestic abuse and harm towards them and the children.

The case of Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 74; [2019] 1 FLR 1175 was considered as an authority for how abandonment or stranding should be interpreted:

• “70. … It is clear from the Practice Direction that the words abandonment and stranding are not terms of art and that they are not intended to be applied in a formulaic manner. This is because there are a number of ways in which a spouse might be said to have been abandoned or stranded abroad or in which the other spouse might have sought to achieve this. I would agree with Mr Gration when he submitted that cases can include many differing elements which militates against their being placed in distinct categories.
• The core feature of the concept of stranding or abandonment is the exploitation or the attempted exploitation by one spouse of the other’s vulnerability or weakness to seek to ensure that they are not able to come to or return to the UK. As Peter Jackson J (as he then was) said in ZM v AM (Stranded Spouse) [2014] EWHC 2110 (Fam), [2014] Fam Law 1402, at para [1] , it can be the ‘opportunity’ the secure immigration status of one spouse and the insecure immigration status of the other gives ‘the former to exploit the latter’s weakness’. However, as PD 12J makes clear, it is based more generally on ‘controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse’.”

factual background

This case concerned Z aged 10 months. The Trust sought an order permitting the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment from Z on the basis that they no longer considered it to be in his best interests.

The application was supported by the Children’s Guardian but opposed by both of Z’s parents.

Z was born with a severe congenital abnormality in his brain development which necessitated fluid being drained from his brain. Z has also suffered additional brain injury, visual and hearing impairments, severe and uncontrolled dystonia, autonomic dysfunction and non-cortical myoclonus.

‘His failed growth rate (static weight for the last 3 months) is due to borderline short gut and gut failure, with current dependence on total parenteral nutrition (TPN). He has suffered two cardiac arrests.’

Z’s parents have attended hospital everyday to visit and have been ‘devoted to Z’s care’. This high level of care by the parents has been recognised by Z’s medical team.

At three months old, Z was discharged home but had to be readmitted nine days later as a result of respiratory deterioration, which a further two days later resulted in a cardiac arrest. Z then needed to be mechanically ventilated for thirteen days.

At six months old, Z suffered a second respiratory and cardiac arrest and ‘was actively resuscitated for twenty-one minutes’.

Z was diagnosed with necrotising enterocolitis when he was seven months old.

At the time of the hearing, Z remained ‘intubated and ventilated via an endotracheal tube in the PCCU’ and ‘requires twenty-four-hour support with his breathing and nursing care’.

Due to problems with various tubes and lines, these have had to be replaced and re-sited which has ‘sometimes had to be done under general anaesthetic or by interventional radiology.’

There have been other difficulties with Z’s treatment.

The two medical leads for Z, Dr A and Dr B gave written and oral evidence which outlined the relevant medical history for Z and an account of the current position. Dr A considered Z to have ‘no prospect of recovery, he is dying and is dying slowly’. Both Doctors made clear in their evidence that ‘the evidence did not support any prospect of improvement for Z’s position’.

Dr A stated that the continuation of ‘aggressive treatment would result in significant suffering’ and thus was ‘not in his best interests’.

Furthermore, Dr B outlined that ‘[Z] does not display any awareness of the world around him except to respond to unpleasant physical stimuli with a dystonic reaction and possibly to calm down when his parents massage him’ however ‘he does experience pain’.

The evidence from the Consultant Paediatric Neurologist Dr D concurred that there is not ‘any realistic prospect of recovery or improvement for [Z] with regards to his neurological function, developmental prognosis or awareness of the world around him. He will remain entirely dependent upon others for all aspects of his daily care throughout his life.’

Evidence regarding Z’s life expectancy was considered to be very difficult to predict however ultimately, the receipt of treatment gave rise to the risk of many complications ‘which could result in his death’.

‘If ventilation is removed, he may be able to breathe on his own but his life expectancy would be limited as he would not be receiving TPN, although would still be receiving hydration. If he was unable to breathe on his own to sustain life he would be expected to pass away relatively quickly. At any point Z could experience an event that could result in his death, for example by an overwhelming infection or an electrolyte imbalance leading to a cardiac arrest.’

Legal Framework

The Judge set out that the paramount consideration is the best interests of the child. ‘This must be considered in its widest sense encompassing medical, social, emotional, psychological and all other welfare issues.’

The principles summarised in Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin) and [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam) at §116 by MacDonald were considered:

1. The paramount consideration is the best interests of the child. The role of the court when exercising its jurisdiction is to take over the parents’ duty to give or withhold consent in the best interests of the child. It is the role and duty of the court to do so and to exercise its own independent and objective judgment.
2. … The term ‘best interests’ is used in its widest sense, to include every kind of consideration capable of bearing on the decision, this will include, but is not limited to, medical, emotional, sensory and instinctive considerations. The test is not a mathematical one, the court must do the best it can to balance all of the conflicting considerations in a particular case with a view to determining where the final balance lies.
3. Each case is fact specific and will turn entirely on the facts of the particular case.
4. In reaching its decision, the court is not bound to follow the clinical assessment of the doctors but must form its own view as to the child’s best interests.
5. The starting point is to consider the matter from the assumed point of view of the patient. The court must ask itself what the patients attitude to treatment is or would be likely to be. Within this context, the views of the child must be considered and be given appropriate weight in light of the child’s age and understanding.

6. There is a strong presumption in favour of taking all steps to preserve life because the individual human instinct to survive is strong and must be presumed to be strong in the patient (see Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] ACR 789 at 825). The presumption however, is not irrebuttable. It may be outweighed if the pleasures and the quality of life are sufficiently small and the pain and suffering and other burdens are sufficiently great. Within this context, as I noted in Re Y (No 1) [2015] EWHC 1920 (Fam) at [37], the right to life under Art 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive obligation to provide life sustaining treatment, but that that obligation does not extend to providing such treatment if that treatment would be futile in nature and where responsible medical opinion is of the view that the treatment would not be in the best interests of the patient concerned (see R (Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] EWCA 1003).
7. The views and opinions of both the doctors and the parents must be considered.
8. The court must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question,  what it involves and its prospects of success, including the likely outcome for the patient of that treatment.
9. Regard must be paid to the rights of the child, in particular her right to life under Art 2 and her right to respect for private and family life under Art 8. Regard must also be paid to the parents’ rights, in particular their right to respect for private and family life under Art 8.
10. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of the child to subject him or her to treatment that will cause increased suffering and produce no commensurate benefit, giving the fullest possible weight to the child’s and mankind’s desire to survive.”